Childhood sexual abuse and effects on marital functioning

Childhood sexual abuse and effects on marital functioning Childhood sexual abuse victimization has detrimental effects on a womans intimate relationships. Adult survivors of child sexual abuse may show difficulties in interpersonal relationships, including avoidance or fear of intimacy, showing low emotional engagement with partners and a pattern of withdrawing from couple interaction during times of high emotion. Adult survivors also may have trouble with trust and may have a poor sense of boundaries and have a sense of powerlessness. Survivors of this trauma often have difficulty establishing and maintaining intimate relationships and experience a high rate of sexual dysfunction. Also, women with child sexual abuse experiences are twice as likely to experience rape as adults and to report having been physically abused by their partners. Thus, this paper will guide me to this paper will channel me to conform and portray substantiation to my claim that childhood sexual abuse operates as a precursor to marital dissonance and marital dissatis faction. It may be unfair, but what happens in a few days, sometimes even a single day, can change the course of a whole lifetime. The Kite Runner Khaled Hosseini Childhood sexual abuse: The subject of child sexual abuse is still a taboo in India. A conspiracy of silence exists around the subject of abuse and a large percentage of people feel that this is a largely western problem and thus abuse, especially child sexual abuse does not occur in our country. Part of the reason of course lies in a traditional conservative family and community structure that does not talk about sex and sexuality at all (Study on Child Abuse: India 2007). Most of the time, parents do not talk to their children about sexuality and during puberty girls are not told about the physical and emotional changes that take place. What then happens is that all forms of sexual abuse that a child faces do not get reported even to close individuals. Children do not realize that they are being abused most of the time. Most victims report having buried the incident as a painful and shameful one not to be ever told to anyone (RAHI, 1998). As defined by the World Health Organization (1999), CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE is the involvement of a child in sexual activity that he or she does not fully comprehend; is unable to give informed consent to, or that violates the laws or social taboos of society. The activity between a child and an adult or another child who by development or age is in a relationship of trust, power or responsibility with the activity being intended to gratify or satisfy the need of the other person is what child sexual abuse is evident by (W.H.O., 1999). This may include but not limited to: The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful activity The exploitative use of a child in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. Sexual violence is any act which may be verbal and/or physical which threatens to break a persons trust and/or safety. It includes rape, incest, child sexual assault, marital rape, sexual harassment, exposure and voyeurism. Yet, sexual abuse can be defined as severe forms of sexual abuse and other forms of sexual abuse. Severe forms of sexual abuse include: assault, including rape and sodomy; touching or fondling the child; exhibitionism forcing a child to exhibit his/her private body parts and photographing a child in nude. Other forms of sexual abuse include: forcible kissing; sexual advances towards a child during travel; sexual advances towards a child during marriage situations or other social occasions; exhibitionism exhibiting before a child and exposing a child to pornographic materials. The World Health Organization (1999) estimates that 150 million girls and 73 million boys under the age of 18 have experienced forced sexual intercourse or other forms of sexual violence involving physical contact. A review of epidemiological surveys from 21 countries, mainly high- and middle- income countries, found that at least 7% of females (ranging up to 36%) and 3% of males (ranging up to 29%) reported sexual victimization during their childhood. According to these studies, between 14% and 56% of the sexual abuse of girls, and up to 25% of the sexual abuse of boys, was perpetrated by relatives or step parents. Thus, it is important to understand the implications of such traumatic experiences and the effects it has on an individuals latter life. Child sexual abuse and its severity, onset and duration of abuse have a crippling effect on the victims life. There are a number of possible pathways by which childhood traumas could impact adult relationship outcomes, including marital satisfaction and disruption. Childhood traumas can result in intimacy disturbance (e.g. fearing, distrusting, and experiencing ambivalence about interpersonal closeness; impaired ability to trust), difficulties with sexual relating, increased probability of physical violence and revictimization, problems with emotional expressiveness and intimacy, and emotional avoidance, which may in turn interfere with effective relationship functioning (Briere,1992; Compton Follette,1998). Review of Literature: Clinicians have long operated under the assumption that early abuse represents a traumatic interpersonal experience with the potential to result in long-term difficulties with intimate partner relations. A number of theoretical models also point to intimate partner relations as an area of difficulty for adult survivors (e.g. Alexander, 2003; Finkelhor Browne, 1985; Polusny Follette, 1995). Among these theories, Finkelhor and Brownes (1985) traumagenic dynamics model has received a great deal of attention because of its utility for explicating the processes by which early sexual abuse may affect a variety of long-term outcomes (e.g. Coffey, Henning, Turner, Leitenberg Bennett, 1996). Although developed with sexual abuse in mind, the proposed traumagenic dynamics are likely to be common across various types of child abuse. Briefly, this model holds that the impact of childhood trauma can be accounted for by the dynamics of betrayal, traumatic sexualization, stigmatization, and powerlessness, which are said to alter childrens cognitive and emotional orientation to the world, and create trauma by distorting childrens self-concept, world view, and affective capacities (Finkelhor Browne, 1985). Finkelhor and Brownes (1985) dynamics are useful for conceptualizing how various marital outcomes may be affected by early maltreatment. For example, the dynamic of betrayal may come into play in the aftermath of abuse when victims come to realize that an adult (often a family member) has violated the tacit but fundamental trust that normally exists between children and adults. Neglect represents a breach of trust whereby adults, who are expected to provide care and protection, deprive children of basic needs such as food, shelter, medical care, and supervision. Traumatic sexualization, which refers to developmentally inappropriate and dysfunctional sexual behavior stemming from sexual abuse, may manifest in a variety of lasting difficulties, including increased vulnerability to sexual assault, over-sexualization of adult relationships, or aversion to sexual relations (Finkelhor Browne, 1985). A third process, stigmatization refers to internalized feelings of shame, guilt, and self- blame that arises from experiencing maltreatment. In the case of psychological abuse, for example, stigmatization may evolve from direct berating by the perpetrator. For other forms of maltreatment, stigmatization may develop in response to the secrecy that often surrounds abuse, reactions from family and the broader community upon the discovery of abuse, and from victims themselves. Carried into adulthood, stigmatization may contribute to lack of openness, feelings of detachment, and general dissatisfaction in intimate relations. Finally, the dynamic of powerlessness refers to a lack of self-efficacy that is said to evolve from the uncontrollable and repeated boundary violations that accompany maltreatment. Powerlessness engendered by early sexual and physical abuse may undermine survivors sense of control in relationships, rendering them less effective in asserting their needs during conflict and decision-making interactions with partners. In the extreme, such an imbalance of power or control may become a risk factor for additional victimizations within the marriage. Conversely, a preoccupation with issues of power may also manifest in compensatory striving on the part of victims to maintain or exert personal control in relationships. The extreme form of this tendency may again be linked to aggression, perhaps initiated by victims against their partners. An emerging empirical literature has begun to test clinical and theoretical assumptions linking maltreatment to long-term deficits in couple functioning. Most of these studies have been conducted with women involved in dating relationships. For example, compared to non-abused women, unmarried women recruited from college and community settings who were exposed to child sexual abuse report having less emotional trust in their partners and view their partners as less reliable in following through with important aspects of the relationship (DiLillo Long, 1999; Mullen, Martin, Anderson, Romans, Herbison, 1994). Although studies of sexual functioning typically have focused on female survivors sexual risk-taking that occurs outside the context of committed relationships (e.g. Orcutt, Cooper, Garcia, 2005), maltreatment has also been linked to sexual difficulties with intimate partners (Leonard Follette, 2002). In a study, women with a history of childhood sexual or physical abuse report engaging in less frequent sexual activity (Dinnerstein, Guthrie, Alford, 2004), whereas both women and men who experienced sexual abuse report more symptoms of sexual dysfunction, including pain during intercourse, difficulty achieving and maintaining arousal, premature or delayed orgasm, and anxiety about sexual performance (Najman, Dunne, Purdie, Boyle, Coxeter, 2005). These difficulties may contribute to survivors lower sexual drive and sexual satisfaction (Randolph Reddy, 2006), as well as greater negative affect while sexually aroused (Schloredt Heiman, 2003). Studies of unmarried individuals have found that a history of maltreatment is associated with later psychological, physical, and sexual victimization by an intimate partner (DiLillo, Giuffre, Tremblay, Peterson, 2001; Whitfield, Anda, Dube, Felitti, 2003). Conversely, links have also been found for both men and women between a history of child maltreatment and the perpetration of physical aggression against a partner (DiLillo et al., 2001; White Widom, 2003; Whitfield et al., 2003). Beyond group comparisons of victims and non-victims, evidence suggests a dose-response relationship between maltreatment and partner aggression, such that men and women from a community setting who were exposed to greater adversity as children (including maltreatment) are more likely to perpetrate partner aggression as adults (Anda, Felitti, Bremner, Walker, Whitfield, Perry, 2006). Difficulties in these more specific domains of couple functioning may contribute to general dissatisfaction and ultimately relationship dissolution for victims of maltreatment. For example, cross-sectional findings indicate that individuals with a history of maltreatment are less satisfied in their intimate relationships than are no maltreated individuals (DiLillo Long, 1999; Nelson Wampler, 2000; Whisman, 2006). Moreover, in the few studies that have examined marital functioning, both husbands and wives with a history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, or neglect experienced higher rates of separation and divorce than did spouses without such histories (Colman Widom, 2004; Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis, Smith, 1989; Whisman, 2006). The research conducted to date suggests that childhood traumas are indeed associated with marital outcomes in adulthood. For example, evidence from both clinical (Nelson Wampler, 2000) and community (Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis, Smith, 1989) samples suggests that childhood sexual abuse is associated with increased likelihood of experiencing relationship problems (DiLillo, 2001; Rumstein-McKean Hunsley, 2001). In addition, a lifetime history of physical attack has been associated with lower marital harmony and lower marital satisfaction in a national, population-based sample (Broman, Riba, Trahan, 1996). However, although the evidence is suggestive that the occurrence of childhood trauma is associated with marital outcomes during adulthood, most existing studies have looked at only one or a few childhood traumas and only one type of marital outcome (e.g., marital disruption or marital satisfaction). Therefore, based on available research, it is difficult to know whether the results obtained from the traumatic events evaluated in existing studies would be found for other traumatic events, and whether specific traumas would be associated with multiple marital outcomes. Similarly, insofar as people who experience one trauma are at elevated risk for experiencing other traumas, it is unknown whether the interpersonal consequences that are attributed to a particular trauma are independently associated with that trauma, or are secondary, due to their shared association with the co-occurring trauma. Finally, as with many studies in the area of marital functioning, samples used in some prior studies are small and not representative of the population of married couples, insofar as they are often based on people in treatment or convenience samples recruited from local communities, which thereby restricts the external validity of studies on childhood trauma and marital outcomes (DiLillo, 2001). Conclusion The current review shows implications for researchers and practitioners alike. Past research has mainly included women although the current literature suggests that among newlywed couples, a history of maltreatment may also be detrimental to husbands marital adjustment. This reinforce the need for future research to take a dyadic approach rather than focusing on only one partner. Maltreatment may have an increasingly negative impact on husbands marital satisfaction over time reinforce the need to examine longer term marital trajectories in relation to mens prior abuse. Extending the examination of change trajectories would enable the testing of the supposition that maltreatment places couples at risk for more quickly reaching critical levels of relationship discord. Studies could also examine the ways that couples with a history of abuse adapt to contextual shifts in the marriage, including those that arise during important developmental transitions already associated with marital de cline (birth of a first child; Huston Holmes, 2004). Clinical writings (Oz, 2001) also suggest that partners of abuse survivors may struggle with unique issues related to their involvement with adult victims. Examining these cross-partner effects will be important to further enhance our understanding of the dyadic impact of early maltreatment. From a treatment standpoint, the early stages of marriage may become increasingly difficult for adult survivors. Thus, child maltreatment should be considered part of the constellation of factors-internal and external to the relationship-with the potential to disrupt marital functioning.

Resolve Conflicts

RESOLVING CONFLICT The conflict resolution requires great managerial skills. Here we are trying to give a solution to a conflict turning it in a constructive side. If one party exercises the principles of interaction, listens, and us the six steps of collaborative resolution, that party may be able to end the conflict constructively. At the very least, he or she may be able to prevent the conflict from turning into a fight by choosing an alternative to destructive interaction? † There is a difference between resolving a conflict and managing conflict.Resolving a conflict ends the dispute by satisfying the interests of both parties. Managing a conflict contains specialized interaction that prevents a dispute from becoming a destructive battle. Managing a conflict attends to the personal issues so as to allow for a constructive relationship, even though the objective issues may not be resolvable. For example, the former Soviet Union and the United States managed their conflict du ring the Cold War by using a variety of mechanisms. The objective issues in the dispute were not resolved, and neither were the personal issues, which contained significant perceptual differences.However, both sides attended significantly to the relationship to keep the disagreement from turning into a destructive battle. Our goal in conflict always should be to seek a resolution based on mutual gain. Realistically, however, resolution is not always possible. When this is the case, we must manage the conflict to ensure that the relationship is constructive and that open communication is maintained. We Listen to Conflict to understand the other party and demonstrate the acceptance required to maintain the relationship

Family Law- Hindu Law

DARSHAN SINGH PATIALVI – ADVOCATE GENERAL | Restitution Of Conjugal Rights: Criticism Revisited| Introduction:- Section 1[1] of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 embodies the concept of  Restitution of Conjugal Rights  under which after solemnization of marriage if one of the spouses abandons the other, the aggrieved party has a legal right to file a petition in the matrimonial court for restitution of conjugal rights. This right can be granted to any of the spouse.This section is identical to section 22 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. [2] The provision is in slightly different wordings in the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, but it has been interpreted in such a manner that it has been given the same meaning as under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, the provision is different under the section 32 Indian Divorce Act, 1869 but efforts are being made to give it such an interpretation so as to bring it in consonance with the other l aws.The provision under Muslim law is almost the same as under the modern Hindu law, though under Muslim law and under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 a suit in a civil court has to be filed and not a petition as under other laws. [3]The constitutional validity of the provision has time and again been questioned and challenged. The earliest being in 1983 before the Andhra Pradesh High Court[4] where the Hon'ble High Court held that the impugned section was unconstitutional. The Delhi High Court in  Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh,[5] though had non-conforming views.Ultimately Supreme Court in  Saroj Rani v. Sudharshan,[6] gave a judgment which was in line with the Delhi High Court[7] views and upheld the constitutional validity of the section 9 and over-ruled the decision given in  T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah. [8]It is a sad commentary that despite various courts including the Apex Court of the Country upholding the validity of section 9. Many jurists still hav e doubts with respect to the soundness of this section and demand its abolishment.Abolitionist's View The abolitionists argue that it is a remedy that was unknown to Hindu law till the British introduced it in the name of social reforms. Even when the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was being passed in the Parliament, there were voices of scepticism regarding the efficacy of this remedy. [9] Sir J. Hannen in  Russell v. Russell[10] also vehemently opposed the remedy. Further, they are of the view any law that forces any person to live with another person is contrary to the value of the society.The remedy openly violates the fundamental right to life, privacy and equality hence is unconstitutional. Further more, there is frequently insincerity in the petitioner's intention. The remedy is blatantly misused to achieve ulterior purposes other than reconciliation, the root cause being S. 13 (1-A)(ii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and has created an additional ground of divorce. Yet another major problem with restitution petitions is that it is used as a defence for maintenance suits. This remedy has been repeatedly misused, abused and exploited. 11]Adding more, the procedure prescribed to enforce this decree under Order 21 Rule 32 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 is also criticized on the ground that in India, where most of the population and especially women (wife) do not have actual possession over any property. In such cases, if a restitution decree is not complied with, then the court is required to ascertain the share of the wife in the property of her husband, when it is not divided and arrive at her share in the property, but this involves cumbersome procedures.Difficulty also arises if the husband does not have a property in his name. Further, it is not correct to think that coercing a person that his property would be attached and sold away can change the attitude of the adamant spouse and make him obey the decree. Counter View However, in my opinion, section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is one of the most misunderstood sections of the Matrimonial law. Despite the controversy it has continuously been upheld by the Judiciary.Even the legislature through various committees and its reports has supported this section. All the reasons so stated by abolitionists can be easily encountered if this socially benefiting section is read in the right light and its essence is understood. It is imperative that a clear understanding of the section 9 is required because it is often invoked. First of all, it cannot be said that the concept of conjugal rights and that its embodiment in section 9 is foreign to the Indian culture and society.It may be borne in mind that conjugal rights. Such a right is inherent in the very institution of marriage itself. [12] The only thing is new is the embodiment of this concept which has been prevailing since antiquity. The prime objective of section 9 is to preserve the marriage. [13] According to the Hindu Marriage Act mar riage is a civil contract and a religious ceremony. [14] It is a contract of the greatest importance in civil institutions, and it is charged with a vast variety of rights and obligation,[15] cohabitation being one of them.It is the very soul of marriage and this section enforces the right of cohabitation. If there is no reasonable ground for living apart, the court orders for cohabitation and enforces the Contract there is nothing wrong as the parties had voluntarily stipulated this at the time of entering into the marriage bond. [16]Section 9, in actuality, is a means of saving the marriage, it is in a sense an extension of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 23 of the Act which encourage reconciliation by the court.It is the policy of the Act that the parties should live together and assist in the maintenance of marriages. [17] By enforcing cohabitation, the court is serving this purpose of the Act. Further, it is criticized on the ground that it allows the withdrawing spouse to take an advantage of his own wrong, which is against the scheme of section 23 and allows him/her to apply for a decree in case of non consummation of the marriage within one year of passing of decree. However in  Dharmendra Kumar v.Usha Kumari,[18] the Hon'ble Court clearly stated that The expression â€Å"in order to be a  Ã¢â‚¬Ëœwrong†Ã‚  within the meaning of section 23(1) (a) the conduct alleged has to be something more than mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled to. [19]It is also often claimed to be gender discriminatory and violative of Article 14. T. Sareetha case[20] confirmed this view. It is obvious that the judge considered the entire question of restitution from the point of view of the woman.It seems that it has been overlooked that restitution of conjugal rights can also be claimed by the wife. It is relevant to state tha t the section is gender neutral as by the Amending Act 44 of 1964 either party to a marriage has been allowed to present a petition for divorce on the ground given in section 13(1-A). Even the party found guilty in restitution proceedings is entitled to petition for divorce under section 13 (1-A)(ii). There is complete equality of sexes here and equal protection of the laws. [21] Therefore this claim of abolitionist is incorrect.Section 9 is also criticized for being an instrument of forced sexual relation and hence being violative of right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21. But much contrary is its purpose. The remedy of restitution aims at cohabitation and consortium and not merely at sexual intercourse. [22] In  Halsbury's Laws of England[23]  it is observed: (cohabitation) aces not necessarily mean serial intercourse, which the court cannot enforce, so that refusal of sexual intercourse by itself does not constitute refusal to cohabit. [24] In support of this propositio n the high authority of Lord Stowell in  Forster v. Forster,[25]  Orme v. Orme, [26] and  Rowe v. Rowe[27] may be cited. One thing is clear from Lord Stowell's decision in  Forster v. Forster[28] and Halsbury's statement of law that the Court does not and cannot enforce sexual intercourse. In cases like T Sareetha, [29] the concept of marriage is pictured as if consists as if it consists of nothing else except sex. Chaudhary, J. ‘s over-emphasis on sex is the fundamental fallacy in his reasoning.He seems to suggest that restitution decree has only one purpose, that is, to compel the unwilling wife to â€Å"have sex with the husband†. This view was discarded long ago in as early as 1924 Sir Henry Duke President in  Jackson v. Jackson. [30]To say that restitution decree â€Å"subject a person by the long arm of the to a positive sex act† is to take the grossest view of the marriage institution. [31]Therefore, it is fallacy to hold that the restitution of conjugal rights constituted â€Å"the starkest form of governmental invasion† of â€Å"marital privacy†. 32] Further, applying the standard that law has to be just, fair and reasonable as enunciated inManeka Gandhi,[33] section 9 said tries to bring the parties together. Whether to grant restitution decree would be just, fair and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of a given case is left to the court to be decided in its judicial discretion. What better guarantee can the law afford for the â€Å"inviolability of the body and mind† of the wife and her â€Å"marital privacy†[34] And therefore it can be safely stated that section 9 is not violative of Article 21.It also stated by critique that restitution decree serve as a stepping stone to divorce and is condemned to be a passage or passport to divorce. The reason behind the scheme of putting non consummation of marriage after one year of passing the decree of restitution of conjugal rights under sec tion 13 of the Act is that the Indian Legislature believes that there should not be a sudden break of the marriage tie. It believes in reconciliation and that that cooling-off period is not only desirable but essential. If the marriage cannot be saved even after passing the decree of restitution it must be dissolved.A factual separation gives an easily justifiable indication of breakdown. [35] That is, under the Act it serves a double purpose. It first finds the fault and where it lies. Secondly it leads to the dissolution of the marriage, if there is no resumption of cohabitation. Further, recognizing non-consumption of marriage after 1 year of passing of Restitution Decree as a ground of divorce enables the aggrieved spouse to apply to the court for maintenance under section 25; and maintenance pendente lite may also be claimed by making out a case for the same as provided in section 24.This enables a wife, who does not desire disruption of the marriage or even judicial separation from the husband, to secure provision for her support by an order of the court under the matrimonial jurisdiction conferred on it, instead of filing a suit for maintenance under the law relating to maintenance now embodied in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956. [36]People who are against the concept of restitution of conjugal rights argue that England which is the nation of origin of the concept has deleted this remedy from its legislation and India is still continuing it.The Law Commission, in their Fifty-ninth Report have- not recommended its abolition nor in their Seventy-First Report of 1978. The Commission was aware that it had been abolished in England under section 20 of the Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1970. However, it is germane to state that retaining this section all these years is not without reason. The truth is that the legislature has not accepted the breakdown theory in toto, as has been accepted in England. [37] Adding on, a recent writer[38] has suggeste d that â€Å"the opinion of Derrett is more realistic and that the Hindu society is not mature enough to do away with the remedy.Its abolition would be like throwing away the baby with the bath-water. â€Å"[39]It is also argued that the methodology adopted in execution of the decree as mentioned in the Code- of Civil Procedure (0-21 Rules 32 and 33) is erroneous as it provides for financial sanction in case of non fulfillment of this decree. It is to be remembered that marriage is also contractual in nature. Providing for a financial sanction in case of non fulfillment of contractual obligation is a common practice. Also that enforcement by attachment of property is provided by court where the disobedience to such a decree is willful i. e. s deliberate, in spite of the opportunities and there are no other impediments. 0 21, Rules 31 and 32 C. P. C. provide only a financial sanction to serve as an inducement by the court to effectuate restitution and serve a social purpose i. e. p revention of the break-up of the marriage. [40]Often the case of  Russel v. Russel[41] is quoted by abolitionist, however the bigger picture as to why Lord Herschell called this remedy as barbarous is not brought in light. What he said and meant was that reasonable excuse, an essential for the decree of Restitution of Conjugal Right, was not confined only to the grounds of divorce.It can as well be â€Å"something short of legal cruelty† which might constitute a reasonable excuse for refusing restitution. What was stated by him was that if the meaning of reasonable excuse was restricted to the grounds, then this remedy shall be barbarous. This is precisely what has been taken care of in India as the history of the Act would show. Section 9(2) as originally enacted provided that â€Å"Nothing shall be pleaded in answer to a petition for restitution of conjugal rights which shall not be a ground for judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce. This created considerable difficulty. The Law Commission in its Fifty-Ninth Report recommended its deletion. It is now possible for the party to plead a reasonable excuse which may not necessarily be a ground either for judicial separation or nullity or divorce. So the Act was amended and by Act No. 68 of 1976 section 9 (2) was deleted. This brought the law in conformity with the opinion of Lord Herschell. It will, therefore, appear that Lord Herschell's expression â€Å"barbarous† was used in a different context. 42]Conclusion In summation, it may be stated that the grounds and arguments are baseless and they do not sufficiently prove that the Remedy of Restitution of Conjugal Rights is archaic, barbarous and violative of the basic Human Rights. It cannot be said that this remedy is unconstitutional. Section 9 has sufficient safeguards to prevent the marriage from being a tyranny. [43]In truth, it serves the social good purpose, by promoting reconciliation between the parties and mainten ance of matrimonial. It protects the society from denigrating. And all the years that it has been enforce it has efficiently played it's a role.References [1] Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 reads as follows:- â€Å"When either the husband or the wife has without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by a petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly†. [2] After the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. [3] Paras Diwan, Law of Marriage ; Divorce, 4th Ed. p. 328. [4] T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah, A. I. R. 1983 A. P. 356. [5] A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [6] A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1562. [7] Harvinder Kaur v Harminder Singh, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [8] A. I. R. 1983 A. P. 356. [9] Jaspal S ingh, Law of Marriage and Divorce in India , (1983), p. 83. [10] (1897) AC 395. [11] A reference has been made to Mr. Prashanth S. J, Hindu Women And Restitution Of Conjugal Rights: Do We Need The Remedy [12] Kondal v. Ranganavaki, A. I. R. 1924 Mad. 49. [13] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhr, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [14] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhr, A.I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [15] Linda v. Belisario (1795) 1 Hag. Con. 216(21) per Sir William Scott at pp. 30, 232. [16] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhr, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [17] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [18] A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 2218. [19] Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumari, A. I. R. 1977 S. C. 2218. [20] T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah, A. I. R. 1983 A. P. 356. [21] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [22] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [23] 12th Vol. , 3rd Ed. , p. 284. 24] A reference may be made to Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [25] (1790) I Hag. Con. 144. [26] (1924) 2 Addf 382-162 E. R. 335 [27] (1865) 34 L. J. P. M;A 111 [28] (1790) I Hag. Con. 144. [29] A. I. R. 1983 A. P. 356. [30] (1924) Probate 19 (2). [31] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [32] A reference may be made to Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [33] Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (UOI) and Anr, A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 597. [34] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I.R. 1984 Del. 66. [35] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Delhi 66. [36] S. A. Desai, Mulla Hindu Law, Vol. 2, 19th Ed. , p. 60. [37] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [38] R. C. Nagpal, Modern Hindu Law, (1983), p. 110. [39] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [40] Saroj Rani v. Sudharshan Kumar Chadha, A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1562. [41] (1897) A. C. 3 95 (16). [42] Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, A. I. R. 1984 Del. 66. [43] Saroj Rani v. Sudharshan Kumar Chadha, A. I. R. 1984 S. C. 1562. | |

Does Coffee Help You Sober Up

You may have heard you can drink coffee or take a cold shower to sober up from drinking alcohol, but does it really help? Here is the scientific answer and explanation. The answer to this question is a qualified no. Blood alcohol level doesnt diminish, but you might feel more awake from drinking coffee. Your body takes a certain amount of time to metabolize alcohol. Drinking coffee does not reduce recovery time, which is dependent on the quantity of the enzymes alcohol dehydrogenase and aldehyde dehydrogenase. You cannot make these enzymes more abundant or more effective by drinking coffee. However, coffee contains caffeine  which acts as a stimulant, while alcohol is a central nervous system depressant. Although you will be intoxicated until your body metabolizes the alcohol, the caffeine can serve to wake you up. So, youre still drunk, but not as sleepy. Worse, judgment remains impaired, so an intoxicated person may feel recovered enough to perform risky tasks, like operating a motorized vehicle. Caffeine and the Effects of Alcohol Over Time Caffeine isnt going to make a big difference in how awake you feel early on while drinking. For the first hour and a half after drinking alcohol, blood alcohol levels rise and people actually feel more alert than before. Drinkers dont feel sleepy until 2 to 6 hours after drinking. This is when youre most likely to reach for the coffee as a pick-me-up. Caffeine takes about half an hour to hit your system, so the impact on your wakefulness is delayed, not an immediate reaction to drinking a cup of joe. As you would expect, decaf isnt going to have much of an effect, one way or the other, except to help replenish fluid lost from the dehydrating effect of alcohol. Caffeine or any stimulant dehydrates you, but full-strength coffee doesnt really worsen the effect from drinking alcohol. Experiments on Whether Coffee Sobers You Up Even if your metabolism is faster, experiments have shown that even after several cups of coffee, caffeinated drunks dont fare better than their intoxicated, uncaffeinated counterparts. There doesnt seem to be any shortage of volunteers willing to drink alcohol and coffee for science, either. The Mythbusters team performed eye-hand coordination tests, had a couple of rounds, performed tasks, and then tested reactions again after several cups of coffee. Their small study indicated coffee did not help eye-hand coordination. The effects of caffeine on intoxication arent limited to humans.  Danielle Gulick, PhD, now of Dartmouth College, examined how well young adult mice were able to navigate a maze, comparing a group injected with different amounts alcohol and caffeine versus a control group injected with saline. While the drunk and sometimes caffeinated mice moved around more than their sober counterparts and were more relaxed, they did not complete the maze as well. The drunk mice, with or without caffeine, did not exhibit anxious behavior. They explored the maze just fine, but they were not able to figure out how to avoid parts of the maze that had bright lights or loud noises. While the study doesnt say, its possible the mice simply didnt mind those things while intoxicated. In any case, caffeine did not alter mice behavior, compared with how they acted when exposed to alcohol alone. The Danger of Drinking Coffee If Youre Drunk One dangerous effect of drinking coffee while intoxicated is that the person under the influence thinks he is more sober than he was pre-coffee.  Thomas Gould, Ph.D., of Temple University, published a study in the  journal  Behavioral Neuroscience that concluded people associate feeling tired with being intoxicated. If they arent sleepy, they may not recognize they are still intoxicated. Not all research is so clear-cut. Studies have been conducted on the effect of drinking coffee on the driving ability of intoxicated subjects (no, the drunk drivers werent out on public roads). Results to date have been mixed. In some cases, coffee seemed to partially reverse the sedative effect of alcohol, leading to an improvement in reaction time. In other tests, coffee did not improve driving performance. You may also enjoy reading  about why coffee makes (some) people poop. Source Liguori A,  Robinson JH.  Caffeine antagonism of alcohol-induced driving impairment.  Drug Alcohol Depend.  2001 Jul 1;63(2):123-9.